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§ 9.01 Introduction* ** 
In late 2016, thousands of people gathered on the wind-swept plains of North Dakota to support 
the fight of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe against the Dakota Access Pipeline.1 Though tribal members 
had begun protesting the pipeline earlier that year, by fall, the movement had gained worldwide attention 
                                                     
* Cite as Monte Mills, “Current Developments in Indian Water Law and Treaty Rights: Old 
Promises, Recent Challenges, and the Potential for a New Future,” 64 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 9-1 (2018). 
** Monte Mills is an Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Margery Hunter Brown 
Indian Law Clinic at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, where he 
teaches a variety of courses related to federal Indian law and also directs the school’s Summer American 
Indian and Indigenous Law Program. He wishes to thank Scott McElroy and Professor Michelle Bryan for 
their helpful comments on a draft of this chapter. 
1 See, e.g., Jack Healy, “North Dakota Oil Pipeline Battle: Who’s Fighting and Why,” N.Y. Times 




and tribes and non-Indians from around the world traveled to the Standing Rock Reservation.2 The fight 
over the Dakota Access Pipeline raised many issues from environmental concerns, to climate change, to 
the potential destruction of cultural sites; however, the rallying cry that unified all those supporting the 
tribal position, “Mni Wiconi,” or “Water is Life,” is telling.3 At the core of the dispute was the Tribe’s 
desire to protect its access to and use of water from the existential threat posed by the pipeline’s route under 
the Missouri River. 
While the fight over the Dakota Access Pipeline gained national attention, it is merely one recent 
example of the ways in which Indian tribes have fought to protect and preserve their rights to water.4 These 
fights revolve around the rights tribes reserved in treaties with the United States or the terms by which the 
United States set aside lands for tribes to use as their permanent homelands.5 Far from relics of history, the 
terms of these agreements have been insulated by the U.S. Supreme Court from interference by states and 
other non-tribal interests for over a century.6 But as history stretches further away from those treaties, 
competing pressures and the passage of time make the assertion of tribal rights to use and access water 
increasingly contentious and complicated for tribes, states, and the federal government.  
Tribes and tribal governments are becoming ever more sophisticated and powerful players on the 
national (and international) stage; concurrently, the federal government is promoting tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination.7 This evolution of tribal governance is particularly striking when considering that, less 
than 70 years ago, the express policy of the federal government was to terminate the status of tribes.8 But 
                                                     
2 See, e.g., Saul Elbein, “These Are the Defiant ‘Water Protectors’ of Standing Rock,” Nat’l 
Geographic (Jan. 26, 2017).  
3 See Rosalyn R. LaPier, “For Native Americans, a River Is More Than a ‘Person,’ It Is Also a 
Sacred Place,” The Conversation (Oct. 8, 2017).  
4 See § 9.04, infra. 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (mem.); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella 
Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017) (mem.). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381–82 (1905) (recognizing a continuing right 
against the United States, individual states, and their grantees reserved by treaties with Indian tribes). 
7 See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2006); Indian 
Trust Asset Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 114-178, § 102, 130 Stat. 432, 433 (2016) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
5602) (reaffirming federal trust responsibility toward Indian tribes, including “a duty to promote tribal self-
determination regarding governmental authority and economic development”). 
8 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 53d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). 
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as the events following the 2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests demonstrate,9 tribal efforts to assert rights 
to or protection of water resources often face an uphill battle, particularly in light of a long history of 
development and use that has proceeded without regard to those rights. In 1973, for example, a report to 
the President and Congress by the National Water Commission noted that the federal government’s failure 
to protect tribal water rights is “one of the sorrier chapters” in a long history of dismal federal-tribal 
relations.10 Nonetheless, like the larger social movement sparked by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, tribes 
across the country continue to push their claims in both legal and political arenas and their efforts show the 
potential to move beyond that history and toward broader protection for tribal rights.  
That broader protection for tribal rights may directly undermine if not upset well-established state 
laws and regulations, the settled expectations of other water users, and the ongoing relationships between 
states, tribes, and the federal government. As a general matter, for example, the federal government defers 
to state authority with regard to the allocation of water resources and the regulation of fish and wildlife 
within state borders.11 In exercise of those authorities, states established comprehensive water adjudication 
schemes and allocated water among their citizens pursuant to those laws and regulations.12 Beyond direct 
regulation of water resources, state and local governmental authorities are also responsible for a number of 
governmental actions, such as constructing roads and approving land uses that cross rivers and streams, 
which may affect waters within their boundaries. Thus, the assertion by Indian tribes of claims to water 
                                                     
9 See Robinson Meyer, “Oil Is Flowing Through the Dakota Access Pipeline,” The Atlantic (June 
9, 2017).  
10 “Water Policies for the Future: Final Report to the President and to the Congress of the United 
States by the National Water Commission,” at 475 (June 1973) (Water Policies Report) 
11 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 666 (authorizing state adjudication of water claims, including those of the 
United States); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978) (“[w]here Congress has expressly 
addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably 
deferred to the state law”); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (states may “protect and 
conserve wild animal life within their borders” consistent with constitutional limitations found in the 
Commerce Clause); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985) (the Clean 
Water Act indicates that “where both the state’s interest in allocating water and the federal government’s 
interest in protecting the environment are implicated, Congress intended an accommodation”). 
12 See, e.g., Justin Anthony Brown, “Uncertainty Below: A Deeper Look Into California’s 
Groundwater Law,” 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 45 (2015) (detailing the history and evolution of California’s 
groundwater laws); Mont. Code Ann. tit. 85, ch. 2 (statutory standards for adjudication of water rights in 
Montana). 
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rights or for the protection of waters potentially challenges these state systems or the rights and obligations 
that have already been established and recognized. 
A number of current developments related to tribal treaty and water rights demonstrate the potential 
impact of these claims. During its 2017–2018 term, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court considered two 
significant cases related to tribal claims to protect water and accepted one for review.13 Simultaneously, 
lower courts continue to hear similar cases and potential settlements of tribal water rights claims work their 
way through the halls of Congress.14 Given their roots in the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes and the 
history of federal Indian law, understanding the nature of these claims and their potential implications 
requires an understanding of the historical legal context from which they arise.  
This chapter serves as a resource for those interested in or handling litigation involving water-
related tribal treaty or reserved rights by giving the historical and legal foundations for understanding such 
challenges. It begins with the federal Indian law basis from which water-related tribal claims spring and 
gives a brief history of relevant precedent in that area. The chapter then reviews the history of Washington 
v. United States,15 which poses the potential to reshape the scope and reach of tribal treaty rights, and one 
pending lower court case brought by the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians to secure their rights to 
groundwater underlying the deserts of Palm Springs.16 Following these case histories, the chapter offers 
concluding thoughts on a future of increased collaboration with the recognition that, particularly as water 
resources grow scarcer, tribal claims will continue to shape the future of water law. 
                                                     
13 See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262 (9th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017) (mem.); United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 
2017), aff’d by an equally divided Court per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (mem.). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017) (addressing 
challenges brought by the United States and Gila River Indian Community to applications to sever and 
transfer water rights); Navajo Nation v. DOI, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) (reinstating the Nation’s breach 
of trust claim alleging a failure to consider the Nation’s rights and interests when the U.S. Department of 
the Interior developed guidelines for managing the Colorado River); Navajo Utah Water Rights Settlement 
Act of 2017, S. 664, 115th Cong. (2017); Hualapai Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2017, S. 1770, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
15 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (per curiam) (mem.). 
16 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. 5:13-cv-00883 
(C.D. Cal. filed May 14, 2013). 
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§ 9.02 Background 
Understanding the nature of tribal treaty rights and claims to water requires a basic understanding 
of federal Indian law.17 Like most issues raised in that body of law, the resolution of disputes over tribal 
rights to water turns on a fundamental conflict between historical rights reserved by Indian tribes and those 
asserting rights based on the legal structures subsequently established through America’s constitutional 
framework.18 Understanding the current conflicts requires recognition of the historical context of federal 
Indian law and a basic background in the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence on reserved treaty 
rights and Indian reserved water rights. This section provides both, in turn. 
[1] Federal Indian Law 
Since before America’s founding, Indian tribes interacted with other sovereign governments to 
establish and protect their rights to property and resources.19 Early treaties between European colonists and 
tribes laid the groundwork for European settlement of the “New World” while setting the terms of relations 
between both tribal and colonial governments. 
These relations remained a core concern for America’s founding fathers who, among other 
concerns, listed King George’s perceived failure to protect them from “merciless Indian savages” as one of 
the motivations for declaring the new nation’s independence.20 Indian affairs also played a significant role 
in shaping and securing America’s constitutional structure.21 Importantly, the Constitution secured the 
supremacy of treaties that the United States entered into with Indian nations,22 a practice that the federal 
government would officially continue until 1871.23 
                                                     
17 For a more detailed examination of the basics of the landscape of federal Indian law, see Monte 
Mills, “Why Indian Country? An Introduction to the Indian Law Landscape,” Indian Law and Natural 
Resources: The Basics and Beyond 1-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2017). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 385 (1905) (addressing Washington’s equal 
footing argument against tribal treaty rights). 
19 See, e.g., Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.01[1] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012); David H. Getches et al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 85–98 (7th ed. 2017). 
20 The Declaration of Independence ¶ 29 (U.S. 1776). 
21 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, “The Savage Constitution,” 63 Duke L.J. 999, 1072 (2014) (many 
southern states, like Georgia, viewed constitutional “ratification as quid pro quo: allegiance in return for 
military support to eradicate the Indian threat”). 
22 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
23 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566. 
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While the interests of the United States and Indian nations and the relationships between them 
varied over the decades in which treaties were made, each side sought to ensure its interests were 
represented in treaty documents. In the early years of treaty-making, for example, the United States sought 
peaceful relations with the numerous tribes on the western frontier that, if allied with European rivals or 
each other, posed a significant military threat to the young and impoverished revolutionaries.24 Tribes, on 
the other hand, sought protection from further interference and invasion by non-Indian settlers and states 
eager to dispose of Indian lands and Indian people within their borders.25 The treaty language of the era 
reflects the agreements made in pursuit of these interests.26 
But as time progressed, the relationship between the United States and tribes changed. Rather than 
just securing peace with potentially threatening Indian nations, the burgeoning United States instead sought 
to expand its territorial rights and ownership by removing Indian people to the western frontier and isolating 
them in certain areas. This practice, combined with drastically dwindling native populations and military 
prowess, changed the nature of treaty negotiations. Thus, as the 1800s progressed, treaties increasingly 
imposed America’s will upon Indian tribes. Treaties of the Great Peace Commission of 1867 and 1868,27 
for example, demanded the cession of vast swaths of tribal territories, the isolation of tribes to certain 
established reservations, and the provision of particular resources in order to promote the transition of tribal 
people from traditional lifeways to more sedentary and agrarian pursuits.28 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551 (1832) (“When the United States gave peace, 
did they not also receive it? Were not both parties desirous of it? If we consult the history of the day, does 
it not inform us that the United States were at least as anxious to obtain it as the Cherokees? We may ask, 
further: did the Cherokees come to the seat of the American government to solicit peace; or, did the 
American commissioners go to them to obtain it?”). 
25 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
26 See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell (Cherokee Indians), Nov. 28, 1785, art. XIII, 7 Stat. 18 (“The 
hatchet shall be forever buried, and the peace given by the United States, and friendship re-established 
between the said states on the one part, and all the Cherokees on the other, shall be universal; and the 
contracting parties shall use their utmost endeavors to maintain the peace given as aforesaid, and friendship 
re-established.”). 
27 For more on the Great Peace Commission, see Kerry R. Oman, “The Beginning of the End: The 
Indian Peace Commission of 1867–1868,” 22 Great Plains Q. 35 (Winter 2002). 
28 See, e.g., Treaty with the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667; Treaty of Fort 
Laramie (Sioux Indians), Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.  
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Despite those changing dynamics and the obvious challenges of negotiating agreements across 
language and cultural barriers, however, Indian tribes still argued for and secured important rights. In 
treaties across the Pacific Northwest, for example, tribes who had relied on salmon since time immemorial 
negotiated for and protected their right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places throughout that 
region.29 Similarly, tribes of the Great Plains preserved their rights to hunt, often “so long as game may be 
found.”30 Perhaps most importantly, tribes also reserved specific territories as their ongoing homelands and, 
despite later federal policies of allotment and assimilation that shattered the integrity of those homelands,31 
many of those reservations remain sacred areas. Even after formal treaty-making ended in 1871, similar 
territories were still reserved and established through congressional action or executive order.32 
The promises secured through treaties and the continuing insulation of tribal homelands from 
intrusion also found protection in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In the early 1830s, for example, 
Chief Justice John Marshall relied upon treaties to define Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” 
existing outside of the constitutional structure but connected to the United States through those 
agreements.33 In part relying on this description, the Court subsequently utilized the federal-tribal nature of 
treaties to exclude tribes from the application of state laws and state authority.34 These decisions have come 
to form the foundation of federal Indian law and emphasize the deferential manner in which the Supreme 
Court has often viewed treaties.35 While subsequent decisions certainly contradict that deference,36 there 
                                                     
29 See, e.g., Treaty with the Nez Percé Indians, June 11, 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the 
Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians, July 16, 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 975; Treaty with 
the Dwámish, Suquámish, and Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, 
Jan. 22, 1855, art. V, 12 Stat. 927. 
30 Treaty with the Crow Tribe of Indians, May 7, 1868, art. IV, 15 Stat. 649. 
31 See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, “The Legacy of Allotment,” 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 7–20 (1995) (detailing 
the decimation of the tribal land base due to allotment). 
32 See, e.g., Exec. Order of May 15, 1876 (establishing the Agua Caliente Reservation). 
33 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
34 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561–62 (1832). 
35 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 19, at §§ 2.01–.02[1]. 
36 See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567–68 (1903) (recognizing congressional 
authority to abrogate treaty promises).  
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remains, in the words of leading Indian law scholar Charles F. Wilkinson, a “tremendously evocative” aura 
surrounding treaties and their negotiation that “most judges cannot shake.”37  
Taking account of this history and in line with the precedents of Chief Justice Marshall, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of treaties in conflicts over water and water rights established 
new doctrines that continue to animate the current conflicts in these areas.  
[2] Indian Treaty and Water Rights 
Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions of the early 1800s positioned tribes within American federal 
structure as a legal matter.38 Thereafter, the removal of tribes to reservations, secured by treaties or created 
by executive order, located tribes geographically within the country as well. Two landmark Supreme Court 
decisions in the first decade of the twentieth century would then set the path for situating the rights of tribes 
to use and access natural resources both within and beyond the boundaries of their reservations. 
In 1905, the Supreme Court took up the first of these cases in United States v. Winans.39 The case 
arose from an effort to prevent the non-Indian Winans brothers from fencing off their property along the 
Columbia River on which they had erected a fish wheel to harvest salmon.40 Though the Winans had 
received a permit for their fish wheel from the State of Washington, the United States, on behalf of members 
of the Yakama Tribe, sought injunctive relief to prohibit the fence and fish wheel.41  
The United States based its request for injunctive relief on its treaty with the Yakama, which was 
entered into in 1855 and reserved to the Tribe “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, 
in common with the citizens of the Territory . . . .”42 By seeking to fence off their patented property to 
protect their fish wheel and exclude tribal members, the Winans were interfering with the rights of the 
Yakama to access one of their usual and accustomed fishing places.43  
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court provided an important framework for the analysis of future 
treaty-related conflicts. Rejecting arguments from the Winans that the treaty ensured the Yakama only those 
                                                     
37 Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern 
Constitutional Democracy 121 (1987). 
38 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561–62. 
39 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
40 Id. at 379. 
41 Id. Though the Court used “Yakima” to refer to the Tribe, the Yakama Nation changed the 
spelling of its name in 1993 to reflect the spelling used in the Nation’s 1855 treaty with the United States. 
12 Stat. 951 (ratified Mar. 8, 1859). 
42 Treaty with the Yakama Nation of Indians, Mar. 8, 1859, art. III, 12 Stat. 951. 
43 Winans, 198 U.S. at 379. 
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rights that any other state citizen would have, the Court made clear that result would be “an impotent 
outcome to negotiations and a convention which seemed to promise more, and give the word of the nation 
for more.”44 Instead, while recognizing that the changing times and circumstances that led to the treaty 
imposed certain limitations on the Yakama’s rights, the treaty itself was “not a grant of rights to the Indians, 
but a grant of right from them,—a reservation of those not granted.”45 The Court described the rights 
reserved by the Yakama as a continuing interest in crossing the land to access their fishing places and made 
clear that those rights would run against the United States, the State of Washington, and its future grantees.46  
Even the contention that such rights would necessarily diminish the sovereignty of the State of 
Washington in contravention of the equal footing doctrine was not sufficient to convince the Court to allow 
the Winans to erect a fence and fish wheel.47 The Court made clear that the United States was free to make 
enforceable and durable treaty promises prior to statehood; however, the Court did note that those promises 
may not “restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation” of the promised rights.48 
Thus, with Winans, the Supreme Court staked out critical protections for treaty reserved rights. 
First, by recognizing the treaty as a grant of rights from the Tribe as opposed to a charitable grant by the 
federal government of rights to the Tribe, the Court cemented the idea of reserved rights into its foundational 
treaty interpretation jurisprudence. Second, the insulation of the Yakama treaty rights from Washington’s 
equal footing arguments further confirmed treaties as the “supreme law of the land” and demanded state 
recognition of those federal rights. But the Court’s caution that state regulatory authority over such rights 
may not be restrained left significant questions to be resolved in various litigation over the subsequent 
century.49 Finally, by approaching treaty interpretation from the perspective that treaties “seemed to 
                                                     
44 Id. at 380. 
45 Id. at 381. 
46 Id. at 381–82. 
47 Id. at 384. 
48 Id.  
49 See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942) (relying on treaty rights to reverse 
conviction under Washington law of a Yakama tribal member charged with fishing without a state fishing 
license); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 399 (1968) (recognizing treaty right to 
fish but also state authority to regulate “the time and manner of fishing . . . necessary for the conservation 
of fish” (quoting Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684)); Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 
(1973) (invalidating state fishing regulations as discriminatory against Indians exercising treaty rights but 
recognizing that “[t]he police power of the State is adequate to prevent” species extinction); Puyallup Tribe, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 173, 177 (1977) (upholding the Tribe’s claim of sovereign 
10 
promise more” to tribes than just the rights otherwise enjoyed by state citizens, the Court highlighted the 
unique nature of those rights, a status that would continue to complicate the accommodation of such rights 
by non-tribal legal and regulatory regimes.  
Less than six weeks after the Court decided Winans, the U.S. Attorney for Montana filed a 
complaint with the local federal district court on behalf of the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes of the 
Fort Belknap Indian Community in northcentral Montana.50 Severe drought in the northern Great Plains in 
1904 and 1905 had drastically reduced available water supplies in the Milk River and the federal 
government, concerned over the potential for the loss of the Tribes’ crops, sought injunctive relief in order 
to prevent upstream irrigators, including lead defendant Henry Winter,51 from diverting all of the Milk 
River’s flow before it reached the reservation.52 Though the United States presented a number of arguments 
in the Tribes’ favor, the newly minted precedent of Winans played a central role in judicial consideration 
of the case’s merits.53 
Unlike the Yakama, the Tribes of Fort Belknap were not parties to a treaty reserving them the right 
to fish both within and at prescribed locations outside of their reservation. Instead, after the formal end of 
treaty-making in 1871, the federal government and a number of northern plains tribes agreed to terms 
establishing various reservations that would serve as their “permanent homes” and help them become “a 
pastoral and agricultural people.”54 Following a survey, the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation was 
established along the Milk River, to include the south half of that river as the Reservation’s northern 
border.55  
Consistent with the purposes of that agreement, the federal government supported the construction 
of irrigation facilities on the Reservation, some of which were funded through federal payments in exchange 
                                                     
immunity from state court orders regulating fishing but rejecting tribal claims to exclusive rights to take 
fish passing through its reservation and lack of conservation necessity). 
50 Judith V. Royster, “Water, Legal Rights, and Actual Consequences: The Story of Winters v. 
United States,” in Indian Law Stories 81, 88–89 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 2011). 
51 Winter’s name was misspelled throughout the proceedings, which ended up styled as Winters v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Royster, supra note 50, at 87. 
52 Royster, supra note 50, at 87–88. 
53 Id. at 90–93 (reviewing lower court decisions); Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
54 Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.  
55 Id. 
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for additional cessions of land by the Tribes.56 But with the drought of 1904–05 and Henry Winter and his 
upstream neighbors diverting water from the Milk River, the ongoing viability of the Reservation as both a 
home- and farmland was in jeopardy. The Supreme Court took up the United States’ claims in 1908. 
As with Winans, Justice McKenna authored the Court’s majority opinion and, while cryptic and 
without direct cite to that case, the first portion of the Court’s opinion in Winters v. United States echoes 
the reasoning of Winans. Like the 1859 Treaty in Winans, the Court viewed Winters as turning on the 
interpretation of the 1888 agreement establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation, but that agreement was 
silent as to the Tribes’ rights to water.57 Consistent with the reserved rights doctrine announced in Winans, 
however, McKenna noted that, prior to the 1888 agreement, the Tribes exercised control and authority over 
a vast swath of land and water and rhetorically questioned whether that agreement could, through silence, 
strip them of such rights.58  
Rejecting such an interpretation, the Court concluded that neither the federal government nor the 
Tribes would have reached an agreement giving away the Tribes’ rights to water, thereby rendering the 
“arid” lands “practically valueless.”59 The Court also noted that, in view of the rules for interpreting 
agreements with Indian tribes, the interpretation favoring the Tribes’ interests is preferred.60  
Beyond relying on the notion of reserved rights and the interpretative rules for Indian treaties, the 
Winters Court also rejected a state sovereignty argument like that made in Winans. Like the contentions of 
the Winans brothers, Winter and his fellow appellants argued that, regardless whether the 1888 agreement 
establishing the Reservation also reserved water rights, any such rights were rendered meaningless by 
Montana’s subsequent admission to the Union in 1889.61 According to the appellants, in order to be on 
equal footing with other states, Montana would have to retain the authority to allocate and protect the waters 
                                                     
56 Royster, supra note 50, at 85–87. 
57 Winters, 207 U.S. at 575. 
58 Id. at 576 (“The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,—command of all their 
beneficial use . . . . Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the 
waters which made it valuable or adequate?”). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. Though not cited in Winters, these canons of construction for Indian treaties originated in the 
Cherokee cases described in the preceding subsection. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 556–
57 (1832) (interpreting the Treaty of Hopewell in view of congressional policy to “treat [tribes] as nations, 
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate”). 
61 Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
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within its boundaries.62 But, relying expressly on Winans,63 the Court instead recognized the federal 
government’s authority to reserve waters from state appropriation and emphasized the disconnect between 
the federal government’s 1888 agreement, which was intended to provide an ongoing homeland for the 
Tribes, and the notion that any rights reserved by virtue of that agreement were repealed the very next year 
by Montana’s statehood.64 
The Winters decision staked out important protections for tribal homelands and claims to water. 
Although the intent behind both the 1888 agreement and the federal policies at the time was to promote 
assimilation of Indians through agricultural pursuits, the Court’s recognition of the necessity of water for 
the survival of tribes and tribal homelands, regardless of whether such rights were expressed in a treaty, 
agreement, or executive order,65 provided an important legal avenue for tribes and the federal government 
to protect these rights. Furthermore, because much of the arid west followed prior appropriation schemes 
for water allocation, where first in time meant first in right, tribal claims could often be the most senior, 
particularly in light of the treaty-making periods of the late 1800s.66 But, while tribes have revived these 
protections in recent years and they remain at the heart of current conflicts over tribal water rights,67 they 
would go largely ignored for the first half of the twentieth century. 
[3] Twentieth Century Challenges 
In its 1973 report to the President and Congress, the National Water Commission succinctly 
summed up the treatment of Indian water rights in the first half of the 1900s: 
Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the Supreme Court again discussed significant 
aspects of Indian water rights. During most of this 50-year period, the United States was pursuing a policy of 
encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, 
it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters 
doctrine.68 
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65 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598–99 (1963). 
66 See, e.g., Todd A. Fisher, Note, “The Winters of Our Discontent: Federal Reserved Water Rights 
in the Western States,” 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1077, 1078–80 (1984). 
67 See, e.g., Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 
1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017) (analyzing tribal claims to groundwater in accordance with Winters doctrine), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017) (mem.). 
68 Water Policies Report, supra note 10, at 474 (footnote omitted).  
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The lack of understanding and recognition of the Winters doctrine and the reserved rights of tribes 
remains significant to the resolution of tribal claims. The expectations of states and non-Indian water users 
established during the first half of the twentieth century often present powerful obstacles to tribal claims. 
On the Colorado River, for example, a 1922 compact between the seven states within the basin allocated 
the river’s water based on the then-current hydrologic understanding.69 But, despite the presence of 
numerous Indian tribes and their reservations along the Colorado,70 Indians and their Winters rights are not 
mentioned in the compact. It was not until 1963 that the Supreme Court confirmed that Winters did apply 
to apportionment of Colorado River water and required that the states recognize reserved rights claims of 
the tribes.71 The Court also identified the practicably irrigable acreage of each reservation as a quantification 
standard for such rights.72 Even recently, the calculation and inclusion of these tribal claims in the Colorado 
River’s supply remain secondary.73 
Beyond the challenges presented by the development of agreements and projects that ignored tribal 
rights during the first half of the 1900s, the legal avenues for resolving such challenges became more 
complicated by virtue of Congress’s enactment, in 1952, of the McCarran Amendment.74 That law, which, 
                                                     
69 Act of Aug. 19, 1921, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171.  
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71 Id. at 600.  
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73 See, e.g., “Agreement Regarding Importance of the Colorado River Basin Tribal Water Study—
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74 43 U.S.C. § 666. 
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according to the U.S. Department of Justice, kicked off the “modern era of western water rights litigation,”75 
authorized the adjudication of federal reserved water rights claims in comprehensive, stream-wide state 
court water right adjudications.76 The Supreme Court subsequently determined that, although not expressly 
mentioned in the law, the McCarran Amendment authorized state jurisdiction over claims brought by the 
United States on behalf of tribes to secure reserved rights to water as well.77 Thus, while state courts “have 
a solemn obligation to follow federal law” as the source of Indian reserved rights,78 they are still free to 
determine the scope, nature, and extent of Winters rights in the context of adjudicating other water rights 
within the state. As a result, approaches to resolving these claims vary widely.79 
Beyond water rights, conflicts over tribal treaty rights also expanded over the second half of the 
twentieth century. While subsequent cases fleshed out the scope of the rights recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Winans over the first half of the 1900s,80 conflicts over treaty fishing rights significantly intensified 
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the Pacific Northwest in particular, the so-called “fish wars” resulted in arrests, 
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76 See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1963). 
77 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 811–12 (1976). 
78 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); see also State ex rel. 
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702 (authorizing a reserved water rights compact commission to negotiate and settle tribal claims to 
reserved water rights). 
80 See, e.g., Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (prohibiting Oregon from 
limiting or abridging fishing rights of the Yakamas being exercised on the south side of the Columbia 
River); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (prohibiting Washington from requiring that treaty rights 
be exercised only with state fishing licenses). 
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violence, and numerous protests.81 In 1970, the United States, for itself and on behalf of a number of tribes 
across the State of Washington, filed what would become perhaps the most important litigation over treaty 
rights since Winans itself.82 Through the initial proceedings in the case, the United States and subsequent 
tribal intervenors established the rights of tribes to up to half of the harvest of salmon across most of the 
state.83 Both Winans and Winters were crucial to the Supreme Court’s 1979 confirmation of those rights.84 
As significant as securing up to half of the salmon catch was, however, additional subproceedings 
in United States v. Washington potentially implicated much broader protections for salmon and the waters 
that they need to survive. As part of the initial case, the United States and intervening tribes also sought 
relief for damage “due to state authorization of, or failure to prevent, logging and other industrial pollution 
and obstruction of treaty right fishing streams.”85 Those claims were initially put off pending resolution of 
the fishing claims,86 but in 1976, the plaintiffs reinstituted them and sought judicial declaration that the 
“right to take fish incorporates the right to have treaty fish protected from man-made despoliation . . . .”87 
In 1985, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected those claims as too speculative 
and general, holding that the requested declaratory relief demanded “[p]recise resolution” that must 
“depend for their definition and articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular 
case.”88 It would take over 30 years for such a case to arise. 
This brief history of federal Indian law and overview of the foundations and development of 
reserved water and treaty rights jurisprudence provide necessary context for considering issues currently 
pending in these areas.  
§ 9.03 Current Issues 
The challenges over tribal water and treaty rights presently before various courts and policymakers 
echo all the way back to Winans and Winters and are rooted in the foundations of federal Indian law. Tribal 
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arguments in favor of rights to groundwater or broader environmental protection from state actions spring 
from the history and supremacy of the tribes’ relationship with the federal government. Meanwhile, states, 
local governments, and neighboring non-Indian citizens counter that honoring such claims could 
significantly impair, if not destroy, their otherwise legally protected interests. The resolution of these 
conflicts will, therefore, largely define the next generation of state-tribal relations and, potentially, the 
future of water allocation and use.  
[1] Supreme Court: Washington v. United States 
The most recent iteration of the original 1970 case discussed in the preceding section began in 
2001, when a group of tribes and the United States reinitiated the environmental claims that had been 
deemed “phase II” of the original 1970 litigation.89 Rather than seeking a general declaration that their 
treaty rights included certain mandates of environmental protection, however, the latest subproceeding 
focused on specific actions that, in the view of the federal and tribal petitioners, directly harmed salmon. 
According to the first sentence of the Tribes’ initial pleading, “[t]he Tribes bring this subproceeding to 
enforce a duty upon the State of Washington to refrain from constructing and maintaining culverts under 
State roads that degrade fish habitat so that adult fish production is reduced, which in turn reduces the 
number of fish available for harvest by the Tribes.”90 Thus, where earlier efforts to enforce environmental 
protections had failed by virtue of their generality and lack of specific facts, the “culverts case” would be 
much more narrowly focused. Despite its narrow focus, however, the case presented a question of 
significant import—can there be a treaty-reserved right to environmental protection? 
The State responded to that question with a range of defenses and counterclaims that would form 
the basis of the State’s arguments throughout the subproceeding.91 As an initial matter, the State argued 
that nothing in the relevant treaties or the Supreme Court’s Indian treaty jurisprudence supported the claims 
of the United States and the Tribes.92 Instead, the State read the language of the treaties in which Tribes 
ceded the land that eventually became the State of Washington to the United States as a recognition on the 
                                                     
89 See Request for Determination Regarding State Construction of Road Culverts, United States v. 
Washington, No. 2:70-cv-09213, Subproceeding No. 2:01-sp-00001 (Culverts) (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 
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part of the Tribes and the United States that, but for the expressly reserved “right to take fish,” there would 
be no ongoing duty imposed upon the State by such agreements.93 In the State’s view, the Ninth Circuit had 
already decided the question of an environmental servitude in its 1985 decision in the matter and neither 
the plain language nor a reasonable interpretation of the relevant treaty language could support the 
injunctive relief requested by the United States and the Tribes.94 Before the Ninth Circuit, the State even 
went so far as to argue that the State could conceivably block every salmon stream in the region because 
the treaties imposed no duty to protect salmon habitat.95 
In addition to its defenses based on the treaties, however, the State also raised counterclaims against 
both the United States and the Tribes.96 In doing so, the State acknowledged that its road projects and 
culverts “have been a factor” in blocking salmon migration but made clear that many of its culvert projects 
required input, if not review and approval from, the federal government.97 In 1996, for example, the State 
developed a habitat conservation plan addressing management of over one million acres of state trust lands, 
including lands within the “case area” of the culverts subproceeding.98 As part of that plan, which included 
road management activities and required the State to identify and retrofit or replace stream-blocking 
culverts, the State sought approval from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the terms of the 
Endangered Species Act.99 But despite the federal government’s trust responsibility to the Tribes and status 
as a party to the treaties at issue, “[a]t no time during the permit application process did the federal 
government inform [the State] that any treaties would be violated if [the State] implemented the culvert 
remediation strategy proposed in the [habitat conservation plan].”100  
                                                     
93 Id. ¶ 5.31. 
94 See, e.g., State of Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Argument in Support at 2, 
United States v. Washington, No. 2:70-cv-09213, Subproceeding No. 2:01-sp-00001 (Culverts) (W.D. 
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The State also alleged that both the federal government and the Tribes installed and maintained 
culverts, as well as other stream impediments such as dams, that block fish passage and contributed to the 
salmon decline.101 In the State’s view, if the treaties impose a duty of protection, then singling out the State 
for constructing and maintaining culverts that violate that duty would unfairly burden the State and interfere 
with the State’s sovereign authority to manage its resources in violation of the equal footing doctrine and 
principles of federalism.102  
Just as with Winans or Winters over a century before, and like the earlier subproceedings in the 
same case, the central issues in the culverts subproceeding revolved around the ongoing vitality of rights 
established under federal law to protect tribal interests, especially in view of changed circumstances since 
the treaties were entered. Like those earlier cases, the arguments raised issues of equal footing and state 
authority, while also presenting the fundamental question of how the federal government’s promises of the 
1800s might still resonate in the 2000s and beyond. According to the State, however, those promises simply 
did not impose burdens on its ability to manage its resources and, even if they did, those burdens must be 
shared, if not borne entirely, by the federal government. Throughout the case, the parties’ arguments 
reflected these general positions.  
Relying primarily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Fishing Vessel),103 which established that the treaties 
reserved “the right to take fish, not just the right to fish,” Judge Martinez initially granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Tribes and the United States.104 Following that decision, he then issued a 
preliminary injunction and, after holding a trial on further remedies, issued a detailed 35-page memorandum 
and decision105 and a permanent injunction against the State.106 As the Ninth Circuit later noted, in crafting 
the injunction Judge Martinez sought assistance from the State but the State declined to participate.107 The 
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injunction required the State to consult with the United States and the Tribes about culverts and develop a 
plan for replacing any culvert that impairs or affects 200 linear meters of stream habitat within 17 years.108 
The State quickly appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit panel issued its decision on June 27, 2016, affirming the district court, and 
amended it on March 2, 2017.109 The panel decision largely tracked both the district court’s analysis and 
the arguments of the United States and the Tribes by starting with the history of the treaties and the Supreme 
Court’s favorable interpretation of the relevant language in Fishing Vessel.110 Relying on the record of 
treaty negotiations, the court determined that Governor Isaac Stevens, in negotiating the treaties, had 
expressly promised to the Tribes that the treaties secured their fish in perpetuity.111 But, even beyond the 
express promises of the treaties, the court, relying on Winters, also found that the treaties inferred the same 
rights.112 Like the implied reservation of water in conjunction with the reservation of land for the Fort 
Belknap Tribes in that case, the court would infer a promise to the Tribes that would “support the purpose” 
of the treaties to sustain them through fishing.113 Thus, the court supplemented the analysis of the district 
court by finding that the treaties both expressly and impliedly promised the Tribes an ongoing and perpetual 
right to fish that, in the court’s view, was being violated by the State.114 
The Ninth Circuit panel went on to dismiss the State’s concerns over the scope of the injunction 
and its arguments that the United States had both waived its claims and was subject to counterclaims.115 
While the court answered each of the State’s contentions regarding the injunction in detail, the court 
generally determined that the injunction was appropriately and narrowly crafted to remedy the harm caused 
by the State’s ongoing violation of the treaties. Therefore, according to the court, the State’s detailed 
objections to the scope of the injunction, and its costs and effect on state government and authority, were 
not compelling. 
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Following an unsuccessful request for en banc review,116 the State then petitioned for, and was 
granted, certiorari by the Supreme Court.117 The State’s opening merits briefing before the Court largely 
tracked the issues argued before and by the Ninth Circuit, presenting questions regarding the nature and 
scope of treaty rights, the availability of equitable defenses, and the breadth and enforceability of the 
injunction.118 But in responsive briefing, both the Tribes and the United States shifted their focus within the 
treaty rights argument to promote the theory that the rights reserved in the treaties prevent “substantial 
degradation” of the fishery resource.119 In crafting these arguments, both respondents went beyond their 
prior Indian law-based arguments and relied upon common law principles prohibiting stream barriers as 
nuisances in other, non-Indian contexts.120 That shift in focus prompted the State to contend that the 
respondents were abandoning earlier arguments and now seeking to rely upon an alternative theory not 
previously argued.121  
These matters animated much of the oral argument before the Court, with a number of the eight 
justices hearing the case pressing counsel for both sides to detail what would constitute “substantial 
degradation” of the fishery.122 Echoing the State’s reply brief, for example, Chief Justice John Roberts 
grilled counsel for the United States about whether the matter should be remanded in order to address the 
common law nuisance argument, which was raised only before the Supreme Court.123 Reiterating the crux 
of the challenge in the case all along, counsel responded that the common law rights available to all citizens 
are simply supportive of the broader tribal claims for protection, but not essential to considering the treaty-
based claims.124  
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On June 11, 2018, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision by virtue of 
a 4-4 deadlock among the justices hearing the case.125 The Court’s one-sentence ruling provided an 
anticlimactic end to the most recent chapter in the ongoing half-century battle over treaty-reserved tribal 
fishing rights in the State of Washington. But just as a majority of the Justices were unable to agree how to 
situate those historically reserved rights in the present-day, lower courts continue to wrestle with that same 
issue in different contexts.  
[2] Developments in the Lower Courts: Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Coachella Valley Water District 
While Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District continues in 
federal district court, the case has already resulted in a landmark ruling from the Ninth Circuit.126 Although 
various state courts previously considered whether reserved Winters rights include a right to 
groundwater,127 no federal court had yet squarely tackled that question.128 Beyond that important decision, 
the case continues to present unique tribal claims to water, both in quantity and quality, and highlights the 
complicated challenge of tribal claims in an era of increasing water scarcity.  
The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians have resided in southern California since time 
immemorial. In 1876, President Ulysses S. Grant established the Tribe’s reservation via executive order.129 
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Though modified by subsequent executive orders,130 the reservation was intended to be the Tribe’s 
homeland in the arid southern California desert, where the City of Palm Springs is now located. Though 
none of these executive orders mentioned water rights, the reservation’s location made access to water 
essential for the Tribe’s survival. 
In recognition of the Tribe’s preexisting use of surface water in the area, largely from the 
Whitewater River and its tributaries, the United States recommended certain water rights for the Tribe 
during California’s adjudication of local claims to water rights in the 1930s.131 As a result, the United States 
secured, in trust for the Tribe, about 8,000 acre-feet of water per year from the local Tahquitz and Andreas 
creeks.132 But as population and water use within the local Coachella Valley grew, water supplies and 
availability became increasingly challenging. 
As noted in a summary of the Coachella Valley’s history of water use and development prepared 
by local water agencies,133 groundwater has served as the major source of water since the early 1900s. Early 
in the twentieth century, however, the valley’s groundwater supply began dropping and the Coachella 
Valley Water District (CVWD) searched for water sources to recharge the groundwater supply. By the early 
1960s, with the construction of the All-American Canal to supply water from the Colorado River, CVWD 
was able to recharge the underground aquifer and restore groundwater levels to historical measures.134 But 
that did not solve the problem for the entire valley as the western portion of the valley continued to 
experience groundwater shortages.135 The Desert Water Agency (DWA) was formed to assist by bringing 
additional water from California’s supply into the valley to recharge those regional aquifers.136 Growth and 
water use in the valley continued to increase and, by the 1980s, the aquifer was in what the agencies refer 
to as “overdraft,” when more water was being extracted from the aquifer than could be used to recharge 
it.137 As such, pumping and development costs increased, more planning and supply strategy became 
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necessary, increased conservation measures were called for, and the valley’s future growth and access to 
water was threatened.138 Thus, in January 2012, CVWD and DWA developed an updated water 
management plan with an objective of eliminating long-term groundwater overdraft, among others.139 
In May 2013, however, the Tribe, concerned about the long-term environmental and water quality 
impacts of the use of Colorado River water to recharge groundwater aquifers, introduced a potentially 
significant complication for the agencies’ planning efforts.140 Claiming reserved rights to groundwater 
under both Winters and Winans, the Tribe brought suit against both CVWD and DWA (as well as their 
board members in their official capacity), seeking declaratory relief establishing their reserved and 
aboriginal rights to that water and injunctive relief prohibiting the agencies from further overdrafting the 
aquifer and injecting recharge water into it.141  
Beyond seeking to break new legal ground, the Tribe’s case also marked a potentially significant 
disruption to the local non-Indian residents’ and water agencies’ existing system of water rights and access 
to groundwater. Like the impacts to the State of Washington occasioned by the treaty-based claims of the 
United States and tribes there, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians’ suit pitted the weight and 
meaning of historical rights against modern (and settled) expectations and complexities.142 
Before getting to those weighty matters, however, the parties agreed to split the case into three 
procedural phases.143 The case’s first phase would be limited to the purely legal issues of whether the Tribe 
had either an aboriginal or reserved right to groundwater.144 Only if phase I resolved in the Tribe’s favor 
would phase II be necessary, which would entail determining the Tribe’s ownership rights to the pore space 
within the aquifer and whether the Tribe also had a right to a particular quality of groundwater, in addition 
to the defendant water agencies’ affirmative defenses.145 Phase III, if necessary, would seek to quantify the 
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Tribe’s rights to water and water quality as well as shape remedies.146 By dividing the case in this fashion, 
the parties were able to isolate the fundamental legal questions for early resolution and leave the more 
complex challenges for a later, and perhaps unnecessary, fight. After the case was trifurcated, the United 
States, seeking to protect its trust interests and responsibilities toward the Tribe, intervened.147 
In summary judgment briefing, the Tribe argued that the reserved rights issue required only a 
straightforward application of Winters, which, while directly applicable only to surface water, had been 
applied by other state courts to recognize reserved rights to groundwater as well.148 The United States 
supported the Tribe’s position and further emphasized that the reserved rights claimed by the Tribe are 
federal rights that would preempt state law or state attempts to limit them.149 
The water agencies countered the Tribe’s position by acknowledging the existence of Winters rights 
but disputing the application of the reserved rights doctrine to the Tribe’s claims. DWA, for example, 
relying on cases involving water rights associated with non-tribal federal land reservations, argued that 
Winters rights exist only where “necessary” to fulfill the primary purpose of the reservation.150 In addition, 
the agency pointed out that, as evidenced by the McCarran Amendment and noted by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. New Mexico,151 federal law defers to state law regarding water allocation and 
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management.152 Therefore, according to the agencies, because the Tribe had an existing state-law right to 
use groundwater, no additional reserved right was “necessary.”153 Beyond that argument, DWA also noted 
the potentially significant impact that recognition of a tribal reserved right to groundwater could have on 
the agencies’ ability to manage and protect groundwater for other users.154  
The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribe and the United States on the existence of 
a reserved, Winters right to groundwater.155 With regard to the reserved right question, the court relied 
heavily on the narrow nature of phase I and focused its ruling only on the existence of a reserved right, not 
the quantification, scope, or impact of such a right.156 Accordingly, the court only analyzed the Tribe’s 
claims in the context of Winters and its progeny, ultimately determining that “[t]he federal government 
intended to reserve water for the Tribe’s use on its reservation,” and that “[r]ights to the groundwater 
underlying the reservation are appurtenant to the reservation itself.”157  
Identifying those two factors as the only considerations relevant for determining the existence of a 
Winters right to groundwater, the court largely dismissed the agencies’ arguments as focused on issues 
beyond phase I.158 In dismissing the agencies’ “insistent reliance” on New Mexico, for example, the court 
noted that Ninth Circuit precedent has cautioned against strictly applying federal reserved rights case law 
to Indian reserved rights cases and that, because the Tribe’s reservation was clearly established to provide 
a permanent homeland, that was sufficient to support the existence, but not delineate the breadth, of a 
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reserved right to groundwater.159 Thus, while repeatedly acknowledging that the agencies’ arguments raised 
in phase I may be relevant in later phases of the case, the court recognized a Winters right to groundwater 
for the Tribe. 
Before the Ninth Circuit, the water agencies joined forces to file consolidated briefs and, despite 
the district court’s admonishment about the inapplicability of New Mexico, the agencies doubled down on 
that argument. In their opening brief, for example, the agencies insisted that the district court should have 
considered New Mexico when determining whether a reserved right to groundwater existed, not postpone 
its consideration until quantifying that right.160 According to the water agencies, such analysis is necessary 
in the first instance to ensure that a reserved right is necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the 
reservation and comply with Congress’s traditional deference to state water law.161 Furthermore, because 
the Tribe already had rights to use groundwater under the California correlative rights scheme for 
groundwater, the agencies argued that recognizing a reserved right that granted a priority date was 
inconsistent with that scheme and not necessary to fulfill the reservation’s purposes.162 Finally, emphasizing 
the recurring theme in these cases, the agencies highlighted the disruptions to the existing state water 
management scheme that the Tribe’s reserved right would have, including the Tribe’s ability to use 
groundwater free from state law restrictions on other users that, in the agencies’ view, would jeopardize the 
use of water by those other users.163 
Responding to the agencies’ arguments, both the Tribe and the United States reiterated the 
straightforward rationale of Winters.164 Both appellees also dismissed the agencies’ New Mexico arguments 
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as irrelevant to the reserved rights inquiry and inapplicable to the phase I questions. Also irrelevant in their 
view were the potential impacts on California law and California water users of a reserved right to 
groundwater.165 On the latter contention, the Tribe noted that the non-Indian water users of the Milk River 
near Fort Belknap had the exact same concerns leading up to the Winters decision.166 
In deciding the matter, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the Tribe’s claimed reserved right by 
addressing the application of New Mexico, ultimately concluding that New Mexico is consistent with 
Winters but is relevant only to determining “the question of how much water is reserved,” not the existence 
of a reserved right to begin with.167 Therefore, the court went on to analyze the federal government’s 
primary purpose for the Agua Caliente Reservation, whether that purpose required water, and, if so, whether 
groundwater should be included in that reservation.168 Affirming the district court’s opinion and analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit answered all three questions in the affirmative, expressly holding that “the Winters 
doctrine encompasses both surface water and groundwater appurtenant to reserved land.”169 The court also 
dismissed the agencies’ concerns about conflicts with state law, noting the supremacy of the federal 
rights.170 But, in concluding its opinion, the court recognized that the posture of the case prevented 
consideration of all of the issues raised by the water agencies, including a full analysis under New Mexico, 
which, in the court’s view, would be relevant for the later quantification of the Tribe’s rights.171 In an effort 
to provide guidance to the resolution of these questions, the court closed its decision by making clear that 
though it could not predict the answer to those quantification questions, the existence of a reserved right to 
groundwater meant the Tribe had at least a right to some quantity of groundwater.172 
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Despite support from a number of states as amici curiae, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari,173 leaving in place the first precedential federal case expressly recognizing a reserved right to 
groundwater under the Winters doctrine. But, as the phase I issues were appealed, the litigation continued 
in the district court, with the court hearing phase II summary judgment issues in April and July 2018.  
In doing so, the court is considering whether the Tribe’s claim for ownership of the pore space 
within the aquifer and claimed right to groundwater quality were ripe for review because, according to the 
water agencies, the Tribe has failed to specifically allege any injury.174 If ripe, the Tribe’s water quality 
claim, arguing that a reserved right to groundwater is essentially meaningless unless that groundwater is of 
suitable quality for use, could build on the Winters doctrine in the same way that the Ninth Circuit relied 
on that doctrine to protect stream habitat for salmon in the culverts case.175  
Beyond ruling on phase II issues, which may generate appeals to the Ninth Circuit and beyond, the 
court also faces phase III questions as well, which will require quantification of the Tribe’s rights to 
groundwater both in amount and quality and, potentially, injunctive relief to protect those rights.176 Unless 
the parties settle these hotly contested issues, more judicial guidance on the meaning and scope of Indian 
reserved rights to groundwater under the Winters doctrine is forthcoming.  
§ 9.04 Conclusion: Looking Ahead 
These and other recent tribal actions to protect and assert rights to water are a drastic change from 
the majority of the last century, during which such rights sat dormant or were largely misunderstood or 
ignored.177 As both cases discussed in this chapter highlight, these demands present historical and legal 
challenges for tribes, the federal government, states, and state and local agencies. From the tribal 
perspective, the cases described herein are necessary battles to insulate the ongoing vitality of their treaties 
and reserved homelands from external impacts and pressures. Similarly, from the state and local agency 
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perspective, these tribal claims present significant threats to their ongoing ability to manage and protect 
their water and natural resources. Given the stakes, the potentially intractable conflict of these winner-take-
all litigation battles is understandable.178 
Ultimately, however, once court decisions are penned and attorney’s fees paid, the parties will still 
need to protect and provide for the interests of their citizens, whether through the continued exercise of 
time-honored tribal treaty rights and use of reserved water or under the terms and conditions of state law 
and agency management. While the ferocity of litigation may spawn enmity in the short term, the long-term 
viability of both tribal and non-tribal communities will depend on intergovernmental cooperation and 
collaborative approaches to resource management. The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 
(CRITFC), which grew out of the need for effective tribal salmon management in the wake of the culverts 
case’s precursor subproceedings and has established itself as a leader in scientific and collaborative fisheries 
management, is a prime example.179  
Similarly, recent settlements of tribal water rights claims have shown the potential for 
intergovernmental cooperation and compromise to serve the broader interests of federal, state, and tribal 
citizens. The 2015 settlement of the water rights claims of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
(CSKT) of the Flathead Reservation in Montana, which marked the culmination of negotiations between 
the Tribes, the United States, and the State of Montana, is another such example.180 That compact resolves 
thousands of tribal claims to aboriginal and reserved water rights across the western third of Montana that, 
but for the settlement, would require adjudication in Montana’s ongoing state-wide adjudication process.181 
Beyond avoiding such complex and burdensome litigation, the compact also seeks to implement adaptive 
management of water resources, including the protection of instream flows aimed at restoring a natural 
hydrograph that was long ago disrupted by irrigation and other water uses, and protect existing water users, 
both Indian and non-Indian.182 While the settlement still awaits congressional approval, the Tribes and the 
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State of Montana were able to work together to overcome significant political challenges and reach 
agreement.183 
Therefore, in addition to the value of recognizing the broader historical and legal context in which 
both Washington v. United States and Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water 
District arise, practitioners would be well-served to consider the broader context of the future beyond such 
challenges. As the history of federal Indian law demonstrates, the assertion of historical tribal rights may 
significantly disrupt established non-Indian interests, but as both the CRITFC and CSKT settlement 
examples show, such disruptions may also provide an opportunity for new collaborative solutions that 
provide broader benefit.184  
The assertion of these claims, just like those in Winans and Winters over 100 years ago, presents 
the potential for a future of increased collaboration and cooperative governance among our nation’s three 
sovereigns. Realizing such potential will demand practitioners who deeply understand each case and the 
context in which it arises. Hopefully, this chapter assists in that effort. 
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